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Summary findings
Frankel, Schmukler, and Serven empirically study the  to 1), even for several countries with floating regimes.
sensitivity of local interest rates to international interest  The data suggest an upward time trend in the degree to
rates and how that sensitivity is affected by a country's  which domestic interest rates are sensitive to
choice of exchange rate regime.  international capital movements and developing
To establish the empirical regularities, they use a  economies' increased financial integration with the rest
reduced-form empirical approach to compute both panel  of the world.
and single-country estimates of interest rate sensitivity  As a result, country-specific estimates for the 1990s
for a large sample of developing and industrial  reveal few cases of less-than-full transmission of
economies between 1970 and  1999.  international interest rates to domestic rates, regardless
When using the full sample, they find that:  of the currency regime.
* Interest rates are typically lower in economies with  Country-specific results suggest that only large
fixed exchange rates than in those with flexible exchange  industrial countries can (or choose to) benefit from
rates.  independent  monetary policy. During the 1990s, interest
* More rigid currency regimes tend to exhibit higher  rates in European countries were fully sensitive to
transmission than more flexible regimes.  German interest rates but insensitive to U.S. interest
In many cases in the 1990s, however, the authors  rates.
cannot reject full transmission (a slope coefficient equal
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As has also been true in past episodes of global monetary tightening, 1999-2000
hikes  in  U.S. interest rates  were  rapidly reflected in  interest rate  increases  in  other
industrial and developing economies.  In emerging markets, the increases were in several
cases proportionally larger than those experienced in the US, presumably because country
and/or currency risks  increased after the Fed decided to tighten  US monetary policy.
Even though the pressure to increase interest rates was felt virtually across the board, one
question remains unanswered: are countries with flexible exchange rates more able to
isolate their domestic interest rates from this type of negative international shock?  This
issue  of  monetary  independence, which  lies at  the  heart  of  the  debate  on  currency
arrangements, is the central question of this paper.
The choice of exchange rate regime-floating,  fixed, or somewhere in between-
has  been a  recurrent question in international monetary economics. According to the
conventional view, the two major advantages of fixing the exchange rate are: (1) reduced
transactions costs and exchange rate risk, that can discourage trade and investment, and
(2) a credible nominal anchor for monetary policy.
The advantages of a flexible exchange rate, on the other hand, can generally be
described  under  one  major  property:  it  allows  the  country  to  pursue  independent
monetary policy.  The  argument  in  favor  of  monetary  independence,  instead  of
constraining monetary policy by  the  fixed exchange rate, is the classic argument  for
discretion instead of rules.  When the economy is hit by a disturbance, such as a shift in
To be sure, other factors enter as well. Two other advantages  of an independent  currency  are that the
government  retains seignorage,  and floating allows smooth adjustment  to real shocks even in the
presence  of price frictions. Most of the important  factors,  however,  can be lumped  into the major
arguments  presented  in the text.
1worldwide demand away from the goods it produces, the government would like to be
able to respond, so that the country does not go into recession.  Under fixed exchange
rates, monetary policy is always diverted, at  least to  some extent, to dealing with the
balance  of payments.  Under the  combination of fixed exchange  rates and  complete
integration  of  financial markets,  which  characterizes the  European  monetary  union,
monetary policy becomes completely powerless. 2 By  freeing up  the  currency, on the
other hand, the country can respond to a recession by means of monetary expansion and
depreciation of the currency.  This stimulates demand for domestic products and returns
the economy to desired levels of employment and output, more rapidly than would be the
case under the automatic mechanisms of adjustment on which a fixed-rate country must
rely. 3
According  to  the  traditional  arguments,  under  pegged  exchange  rates  and
unrestricted capital flows, domestic interest rates cannot be set independently, but rather
must track  closely those prevailing in the  country to which the  domestic currency is
pegged.  By contrast, under a flexible exchange rate arrangement, the domestic interest
rate should be less sensitive to changes in international interest rates-other  things equal.
Countries with intermediate regimes should also display less sensitivity to international
interest rates than countries with firm pegs.
However, an  alternative view-stated,  among  others, by  Calvo  and  Reinhart
(2000a and 2000b) and  Hausmann, Panizza, and Stein (2000)-holds  that there  exists
2 An expansion  in the money  supply has no effect:  the new  money flows  out of the country,  via a balance
of payments deficit,  just as quickly  as it is created. In the face  of an adverse  disturbance,  the country
must simply live with the effects. After a fall in demand, for example,  the recession  may last until
wages  and prices  are bid down,  or until some  other  automatic  mechanism  of adjustment  takes  hold.
3For  a more  complete  exposition  of the advantages  and disadvantages  of alternative  exchange  rate regimes,
see Frankel,  Schmukler,  and Serven  (2000).
2"fear of floating," that prevents  countries  with de jure flexible regimes from allowing
their exchange rates to  move freely.  According to  this view, factors like lack of
credibility,  exchange  rate pass-through,  and foreign-currency  liabilities  prevent countries
from pursuing  an independent  monetary policy, regardless  of their announced  regime.
Therefore, many countries, even if  formally floating, are de facto  "importing" the
monetary  policy of major-currency  countries,  much  as those with  pegs.
Although  monetary  independence  has been  at the heart of the debate  on exchange
rate regimes,  empirical  evidence  on the issue is still scarce. In particular,  there are few
empirical  studies  on whether  floating  exchange  rate regimes  do indeed allow  independent
monetary  policy, in the sense that interest  rates in countries  with floating  regimes  are less
sensitive to  foreign interest rates.  Focusing on currency boards and some floating
regimes, Borensztein  and Zettlemeyer  (2000) find some evidence  consistent with the
traditional view.  On the other hand, selected country evidence during the 1990s-
reported  in Frankel  (1999)  and Hausmann,  Gavin, Pages,  and Stein (1  999)-is  consistent
with the alternative  view.
The goal of this paper is to establish  the major empirical  regularities  concerning
the sensitivity  of domestic interest rates to international  interest rates under different
currency  regimes.  To do this, we analyze  existing  experiences  from the widest possible
spectrum  of regimes, from full exchange  rate flexibility  to currency  boards. Thus, the
paper  should  help  place the ongoing  debate in the context  of the observed  facts,  and allow
3an assessment of the competing claims cited above on the relative merits of alternative
exchange rate arrangements from the perspective of monetary independence. 4
The  paper  extends  the  empirical  literature  in  several directions.  First,  while
previous studies have been limited to a handful of countries over short time periods, here
we consider a much larger data set in both the cross-country and time-series dimensions,
by  working with  a  sample of industrial  and  developing  countries over the  last  three
decades.  Second, we test the robustness of the results to changes in sample coverage.
We present estimates both .for the overall sample as well as subsamples of industrial and
developing countries and different time periods.  Third, to deal with the inaccuracies of
standard  exchange  rate  regime  classifications, we  also  present  empirical  results  for
selected countries, whose exchange arrangements are generally regarded as more clear-
cut than the rest.  Finally, even though we  work mainly with US rates as our primary
indicator of "foreign interest rates,"  we also take into account the emergence in recent
years  of  other  currency  areas,  most  notably  the  Deutsche  mark-European  Monetary
Union (DM-EMU) zone.  Thus, we examine the sensitivity of European interest rates to
German interest rates.
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  introduces  the
methodology and data used in this paper.  Section 3 presents pooled estimation results by
exchange rate regime, income group, and decade.  Section 4 takes a closer look at the
evidence from individual  countries.  Section  5 summarizes the results  and concludes.
The Appendix describes the exchange rate regimes in each country in the sample.
4 There  is an extensive  literature  that studies  the merits  of different  exchange  rate regimes  in other
dimensions.  For  example,  Ghosh,  Gulde,  Ostry,  and Wolf  (1996)  analyze  the behavior  of inflation
and  growth  under  alternative  exchange  rate  arrangements.
42.  Methodology  and Data
In principle, there are several factors that determine the extent to which domestic
and  foreign  interest  rates  move  together.  The  first  one  is  the  degree  of  financial
integration of the domestic economy into world markets.  For example, as described in
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2000), barriers to international capital flows can dampen the
response of local interest to changes in international rates.  Second, the degree of  real
international integration also matters for the comovement of domestic and foreign interest
rates-if  business cycles are highly synchronized across countries, domestic and foreign
rates will tend to move closely together, given other things.  Third, the nature of shocks
also  contributes  to  determine  the  degree  of  comovement.  Unlike  country-specific
idiosyncratic  shocks,  common  shocks-such  as  financial  and  climatic-affect  many
countries simultaneously, what tends to be reflected in closer correlation of interest rates,
for given degrees of intemational real and financial integration.
Our  primary  concern  here,  however,  is to  establish  the  empirical  regularities
regarding the overall link between local and foreign interest rates, rather than sorting out
the role of each of the  above factors.  Thus,  we focus  on the estimation  of a  simple
reduced-form specification of the type
r,,t = f  +  r  +r3<  X+X  +,,  (1)
where i = 1.N  and  t = 1.T.  Here r,'  represents the domestic nominal interest rate in
local currency of country i at time t;f  is a country-specific effect; 5 r,<is the international
interest rate; and Xi,, is a set of control variables.  We assume that the error term  ej  has
5mean  zero  and  is  independently distributed across  countries, but  is  possibly
heteroskedastic  and serially  correlated.
We experimented  with two sets of control variables X,,.  The first one includes
only the difference  between  the domestic  and foreign  inflation  rates. 6 We do this because
much of the variation  in nominal interest rates across countries  and over time may just
reflect  variation  in inflation  rates,  which is quite substantial  in our sample.
Next, we added  into  Xi, a set of dummy  variables  to control  for turbulent  periods,
when the sensitivity  of local interest rates to foreign  ones may differ from its "normal"
value.  Specifically,  we used three dummies. The first one is a "crisis" dummy that,
following  the literature  on exchange  rate crises,  takes a value of one when the cumulative
depreciation  of the nominal  exchange  rate over a three-month  period  is equal  to or greater
than 15 percent. The second is a hyperinflation  dummy  that takes a value of one when
monthly inflation is above 50 percent, and zero otherwise.  Finally, the third is a
"transition"  dummy  to control  for changes  in the exchange  rate regime-specifically, exit
from pegs to other regimes. Since such exits tend to be accompanied  by considerable
financial  turbulence,  in the absence  of controls  the new regime  may be unduly associated
with higher or more volatile interest rates and inflation, among other things. 7 The
transition dummy  takes a value of one in the month of the transition  as well as those
5 Note that time specific  effects  cannot  be included,  because  they would  be perfectly  collinear  with r; .
6 All interest rates and inflation  rates  x are defined  as In (I  +x).  We also experimented  with a somewhat
more general  version including  separately  domestic  and foreign  inflation,  rather  than entering  them as
a differential.  Results  with this broader  specification,  however,  showed  that in general  the differential
specification  was not rejected  by the data.
7This is noted,  for  example,  by Edwards  and Savastano  (1999).
6immediately preceding and  following it.8 To allow some additional flexibility  in our
specification, we also interacted the three dummies with the foreign interest rate.  On the
whole, the empirical results obtained including the dummies were quite similar to those
from the specification with inflation  alone, and hence to save space we only report the
latter below. 9
We estimate equation (1) separately for each currency regime, since preliminary
evidence  showed that  neither  the  country  effects nor  the  coefficients  on  the  control
variables  were  equal  across  regimes.  For  each  regime,  we  are  interested  in  two
parameters,  characterizing respectively the  sensitivity of the  local interest rate  to the
foreign rate (,B  in equation (1) above), and the average level of the local interest rate after




that is, the average of the country-specific effects under the regime in question.'°
We present two types of estimates.  In section 4, we report pooled  fixed-effect
estimates,  combining all  the  available  information  as  well  as  grouping  countries  by
income level and breaking the  sample by decade (1970s,  1980s, and  1990s), to  see if
8 We also experimented with other specifications  enlarging the  transition period and  dropping the
corresponding  observations. Likewise,  we used different  variations on our crisis dumnmy-working
with  higher  and lower  depreciation  thresholds  and periods. These  alternative  specifications  had only a
modest  impact  on the parameters  of interest.
9Those  results  are available  upon  request  and downloadable  from www.worldbank.org/lacconferences.
10  Strictly speaking,  this definition  would apply if under  each exchange  rate regime  all countries  possessed
the same number of time-series  observations. In practice, this is not the case because  our panel is
heavily unbalanced. The formula  then is amended  using weights  given by the respective  number  of
observations.
7there are any  significant differences  along these dimensions.  In  section 5, we  report
country-specific estimates, for which  N = 1 and hence the level parameter  a  is just the
regression constant.
According to conventional wisdom, more flexible exchange rate regimes should
allow countries additional room to pursue their independent monetary policy.  Therefore,
the  sensitivity to  international  interest rates  should increase  with  the  rigidity  of the
exchange rate  regime.  In  other  words,  for  a  given  degree of  capital mobility,  real
integration, and other factors, we would expect 
3fixed )Pintermediate)  Ofloating  In fact, in a fixed
exchange rate regime  with  full capital mobility we  should expect  Pfixd  =  1.  At  the
opposite extreme, if domestic  monetary policy  is  completely  independent,  we  would
expect  Pfloating  °0.  In that case, the exchange rate bears the burden of absorbing the
shocks to  international interest rates.  However, it is more  common  for  countries to
pursue  "dirty  floating"  arrangements under  which  they  usually  intervene  in  foreign
exchange markets, and in those cases we should find  Amanaged  floating)
0
In turn, the country-specific effect fi measures, for each country and under  each
regime, the average level of the interest rate not accounted for by foreign interest rates
and the inflation differential.  Hence, it may be viewed as reflecting the mean level of
currency risk  and  country risk  not captured  by  other  variables.  The average  of the
country-specific effects under each regime (a  as defined earlier) can then be viewed as a
measure of the regime's mean currency risk plus country risk.  Thus, if for example more
rigidly fixed exchange rate regimes  reduce devaluation expectations, for given country
risk perceptions, we should obtain afiX,d  (aintermediate(afloating'
82.1 Data
Our basic source of interest rate data is the Intemational Financial Statistics of the
IMF.  We work with monthly data on local money market rates for the 1970s, 1980s, and
1990s.  We choose money market interest rates because they reflect market forces better
than deposit rates.  The latter, while much more widely  available, are often subject to
administrative  controls  and  in  many  cases  display  little  movement  over  prolonged
periods, which  renders  them  uninformative  for  our  purposes.'"  When  available,  we
choose  the  90-day  money  market  rate;  otherwise,  we  use  the  30-day  rate.  As
international  interest  rate,  we  use  the  90-day  US  T-bill  rate.  12  Finally,  for  some
experiments below, we use also the German 90-day T-bill rate.
The classification of exchange rate regimes is taken from the IMF.  The Appendix
lists the  regime prevailing  in  each  country over  the  sample period  according to  this
source.  The classification used here is based on a quarterly database from the IMF on
exchange rate regimes encompassing a total of 10 categories, based on officially reported
exchange arrangement for the period 1975-1996; see the Appendix for more details.  We
present some empirical results (in Table  1 below) from estimating equation (1) using the
detailed regime categories in the original source.  However, to facilitate our analysis, in
the rest of our experiments we condense these categories into three broader exchange rate
In a number  of cases we found that the money market  interest rate data from IFS were identical to the
deposit data.  In such cases, we discarded  countries/periods  for which rates showed  no variation  or
infrequent  step-wise  movements.
12 We also experimented  with the LIBOR  US dollar rate. The results  were very similar,  since  the two rates
are very  highly  correlated
9regimes:  fixed (pegs), intermediate  (limited  flexibility,  crawls, bands, managed  floating),
and flexible  (free-floating).  13
The rest of our data-exchange  rates, inflation,  and country indicators,  such as
population  and income level on which the sample selection is based-come  from the
World  Bank-IMF  databases.
We focus on industrial economies and middle-income  developing countries.
Within this broad group, sample coverage is dictated by the availability of adequate
interest  rate data.' 4 The sample  that results comprises  47 countries  (18 industrial  and 29
developing)  in addition  to the US, whose  interest rate is used as an explanatory  variable,
and a total number  of monthly  observations  exceeding  9,400.
3.  Interest Rate Sensitivity: Pooled Estimates
We first assess empirically the sensitivity of domestic interest rates to US interest
rates  by  estimating  equation  (1)  using  the  entire  sample,  as  well  as  distinguishing
between industrial and developing countries and considering subsamples defined by time
period.
Table  I  presents  the  full-sample fixed-effects estimation  results, using  a five-
regime classification of currency arrangements.  To avoid cluttering the table, here and in
the rest of the paper we only report the coefficients of interest-i.e.,  the slope parameter
13  As a robustness  check,  we compared  the results obtained with this condensed  classification  with those
obtained  using the classification  of Ghosh et al. (1996). On the whole, the results were very similar.
14  We dropped  country/regime  episodes  possessing  less than one year of consecutive  monthly  observations.
We also excluded  countries  with population  under one million, countries  without  availability  of long
exchange  rate series  (which  automatically  leads  to the exclusion  of Eastern  European  economies),  low
income  countries  (in which the incidence  of interest  rate controls is more  widespread),  and countries
with prolonged  internal  or external  war periods.
10f3  and the level parameter a  defined earlier-and  omit the estimated coefficients on the
inflation differential and the individual country-regime fixed effects.
The top line of Table 1 shows that for the entire sample, taken as a whole, the
sensitivity of domestic to foreign rates is 0.76-and  not significantly different from one
at  conventional significance levels.  The rest  of the  table shows the  results  obtained
estimating separate panels by exchange rate regime.  Taken at face value, the pattern of
slope  coefficients  that  emerges  across  regimes  seems  to  conform  to  conventional
wisdom:  it  is highest  (at  0.76)  in the pegged  regimes-followed  by  the  intermediate
regimes at 0.55.  Interestingly, there seems to be little difference whether the peg is to
the US dollar or to other currencies.  Floating regimes show the lowest interest sensitivity
at  0.27.  In fact, for  the pure  and  managed floating regimes, the  slope coefficient  is
estimated imprecisely and is not significantly different from zero.
The  estimated constants  under  each  regime  also  deserve mention.  As  noted
earlier,  they  could  be  viewed  as  reflecting  the  level  of  the  domestic  interest  rate
characteristic of each regime, after removing the effects of inflation and international
interest rates.  The table shows that, given other things, the level of local interest rates is
lowest under fixed  exchange rate  arrangements.' 5 At  the  other extreme, floating and
managed  floating regimes tend  to  exhibit  the highest  interest rate  levels, given  other
factors.
In  spite of  the  simplicity  of  our  empirical  specifications,  they  capture  a  fair
amount of the observed variation in interest rates, as shown by the total and within R 2
15 Actually,  the level  estimate  is lowest  for  pegs  to currencies  other  than  the dollar. This  might  reflect  the
fact  that  during  the sample  period  these  currencies  had,  on  average,  lower  interest  rates  than  the ones
pegged  to  the  US  dollar.
11statistics in the table.  (The within R 2 excludes the portion of the fit attributable to the
specific effects.)
Thus, pooling all countries and all time periods, the results seem to support the
traditional view, according to which interest rates from more flexible currency regimes
are less sensitive to foreign interest rates.  We next investigate whether this result holds
when we partition the sample by income level and time period.  To keep the amount of
information manageable, we proceed  in the  same fashion as  Ghosh  et  al. (1999)  and
condense the various exchange rate regimes  into only three  broader categories:  fixed,
intermediate, and floating.
Table 2 divides the sample between industrial and developing countries.  For the
entire sample of developing countries, the slope estimate is close to one (although not
very  precise);  while  for  industrial  economies  it  is just  above  0.62  and  significantly
different from unity.  As before, however, there are imnportant  differences across regimes.
In both subsamples, the largest slope coefficient corresponds to the pegged regimes-
close  to  unity  in the  industrial  countries,  but  considerably  lower  in  the  developing
countries.  In  the  industrial  economies,  the  intermediate  regimes  exhibit  the  least
sensitivity to foreign interest rates.  In the developing countries, no clear conclusion can
be  drawn since  the slope  estimate under  floating is highly  imprecise (and  negative).
Interestingly, slope estimates  are  uniformly  lower  in  the  developing  country  sample,
regardless  of regime.  Rather  than  implying  that  developing  countries  enjoy  more
monetary independence than industrial ones under any regime, the likely explanation for
this result is that, over the full 30-year sample period, developing economies  were on
12average less integrated than industrial economies into world financial markets and their
interest rates are determined less freely in the market.
Finally,  the  regime  constants  show  a  pattern  opposite  to  that  of  the  slope
estimates: for each regime, they are larger in the developing country sample than in the
industrial country sample.  The difference is particularly striking in the case of floating
regimes.  This  suggests that, other  things  equal, developing  countries tend  to  exhibit
higher interest rates than industrial countries.  Across regimes, the same pattern found in
Table  1 holds  for  both developing  and  industrial countries: the  constant  is lowest  in
pegged regimes than in the rest.
The above results are open to question, however, because the long time span of
the full sample may conceal significant variation over time in the sensitivity of domestic
to  foreign interest rates,  as barriers to  international capital movements  have  declined
steadily over the last two decades.  To explore this, Tables 3 and 4 further disaggregate
the  samples of developing  and  industrial countries by  decade.  Table  3 presents  the
results for developing countries by decade and regime.  It is apparent from the table that
our slope estimates under floating regimes are very poor in all three decades of available
data-the  point estimates are negative and exhibit large standard errors.  Leaving floating
regimes aside, the table does suggest an upward trend in the estimated slope coefficients
across decades, both for fixed and intermediate regimes.  In the  1990s, both fixed and
intermediate regimes exhibit a  high degree of sensitivity to foreign interest rates,  with
slope coefficients not significantly different from unity.
Table  4  presents  the  same  information  as  the  previous  table  for  industrial
economies.  It is important to note that the industrial country sample does not include any
13fixed regimes after the 1970s; hence the fixed exchange rate results for the 1970s are just
those  shown  in  Table  2  above  for  the  entire  sample period,  and  they  reveal  full
transmission  of  international  interest  rates.  In the  1970s and  1980s, there  is  little
difference between the  slope estimates  of intermediate and  floating regimes, with the
former  slightly  larger  than  the latter.  In the  1990s, however, the  result  is reversed:
floating regimes show a slope estimate very close to one, while for intermediate regimes
we obtain a puzzling slope estimate, small and not different from zero.
To summarize this section, a naive look at our full-sample results would seem to
lend support to the conventional wisdom that fixed exchange rate regimes show greater
sensitivity of domestic to foreign interest rates than the other regimes.  In addition, fixed
regimes  also tend  to exhibit lower  average interest rates  after other  factors have been
taken  into account.  Using the  full  sample period,  we  also  find  that  in  general  the
sensitivity of domestic interest rates to foreign rates appears higher in industrial than in
developing countries, a result suggestive of the more limited financial integration of the
latter economies over the sample period.
When looking at  the results in more  detail, however, the conventional  wisdom
fares less well, and some puzzles emerge.  First, among developing economies, both the
fixed and intermediate regimes appear to exhibit full transmission of foreign interest rates
in the 1990s. In contrast, the pooled data do not yield any sensible slope estimates for the
developing-country floating regimes.  Second, among  industrial countries, the floating
regimes also exhibit full transmission in the 1  990s, while intermediate regimes display an
awkward pattern, with their slope estimate declining to nearly zero  in the  1990s.  This
latter result is puzzling, because it appears to run counter the worldwide trend towards
14increasing  financial  integration. It is worth  noting that the EMU group accounts  for the
bulk of countries  under this regime in the 1990s,  and this raises the question  of whether
US interest rates-rather  than, say, German interest rates-really  provide the right
measure  of external  financial  conditions  for this group of countries.
In summary,  there are clear discrepancies  between  the pooled  estimates  from the
full sample and those obtained from the income and period-based subsamples, In
addition,  the results using pooled data may also suffer from limitations  related to the
accuracy  of the underlying  regime classification,  as well as the more general concern  of
heterogeneity  across countries-which the pooled  estimates  limit to the relatively  trivial
dimension  of country-specific  constants. To assess the relevance  of these concerns,  we
next turn to country-specific  estimation.
4.  Interest Rate Sensitivity: Heterogeneous  Estimates
To  avoid possible heterogeneity  biases that rnight be present in  the pooled
estimates of the previous section, here we focus on  individual-country  estimates of
equation  (1). Further,  we focus on a few selected  countries  whose  exchange  rate regime
can be categorized  in a relatively straightforward  manner, in order to avoid the risks of
misclassification  that arise when using a large number of countries. Also, we limit our
attention  to the 1990s,  where the puzzles  mentioned  above  appear  more evident.
Table 5 presents estimation  results for 10 developing  countries,  grouped in the
following  three regime  categories. Hard  pegs (currency  boards)  consist of Argentina  and
Hong Kong.  Intermediate  regimes (including currency bands, managed floats, and
similar arrangements)  involve Chile, Indonesia,  Israel, Singapore,  and Thailand. Free-
15floating regimes comprise Mexico after the Tequila crisis, Philippines, and  South
Africa.  i
6 In addition  to the point  estimates  and their standard  errors, the table also reports
the p-values  from the test of the null hypothesis  that the slope  coefficient  equals  one (i.e.,
full sensitivity  of domestic  interest  rates  to foreign  interest  rates).
The first two rows of Table 5  report the estimates for the "hard pegs" of
Argentina  and Hong Kong. The point estimates  of the slope coefficient  are close to one,
although  the estimate  for Argentina  is rather  imprecise. The next block  in Table 5 reports
the results for the intermediate  regimes.  Here all the slope estimates are statistically
different  from zero, and several  of them are actually  larger than one.  1
7 In fact, we cannot
reject  the hypothesis  that US interest  rate changes  are fully reflected  in local rates for any
of the countries  in the table.
The  last block in  the  table  presents the  floating regimes, which  yielded
implausible slope estimates in the pooled regressions of the previous section.  For
Mexico,  this continues  to be the case in Table 5. The point  estimate  is large,  negative  and
very imprecise,  a likely reflection  of the financial  turbulence  following  the Tequila crisis
that resulted  in skyrocketing  domestic  interest  rates at a time when they  were declining  in
the US.  For the Philippines,  in contrast, we fmnd  a high slope coefficient,  above unity.
Finally, for South Africa the slope coefficient exceeds one at  standard confidence
16 In a number  of instances  the residuals  display  serial  correlation;  rather  than differencing  the data and
losing  potentially  valuable  information,  we report Newey-West  standard  errors robust to both
heteroskedasticity  and autocorrelation.  We set the number  of lags  for the Newey-West  covariance
matrix  computation  at three.  Results  with  other  lag specifications  were  similar  in  most  instances.
17 Whenever  data  permitted,  we also  computed  country-specific  estimates  for an extended  sample  period,
which  we  do not  report  to  save  space. With  very  few  exceptions,  the estimates  for  the 1  990s  reported
here  were  generally  larger  than  those  calculated  with  longer  samples,  suggesting  an upward  time  trend
in  the  degree  of interest  rate  transmission.
16levels.' 8 The pattern of the estimated  constants  across  regimes  is also reminiscent  of that
found  in the previous  section:  they are generally  higher  in the floating  regimes  than in the
rest.
On the whole, therefore, the developing country estimates do not show much
difference across exchange regimes regarding the sensitivity  of local interest rates to
foreign ones.  In most cases the estimates are consistent with the hypothesis of full
transmission  of foreign interest rate disturbances,  regardless  of exchange regime. One
important  exception  is Mexico,  where the estimates  are too imprecise  to permit any firm
conclusion.  In the rest of cases, however,  the data suggest  that the slope coefficients  are
equal  to or greater  than one in the 1  990s.
We now  turn to the industrial  countries. The pooled  estimates  from the previous
section revealed  two surprising  facts. First, intermediate  regimes appeared  to exhibit a
declining  sensitivity  to foreign  interest rates, which became  practically  negligible  in the
1990s. Second,  floating regimes showed  the opposite  trend, with their slope coefficient
becoming  equal  to one in the 1  990s. We  next explore  these  two issues  in more  depth.
Concerning the first puzzle, it  is important to  note that European countries
account for the bulk of  the intermediate regimes in  the  1990s.  Country-specific
estimates,  which we do not report here to save space, confirm the findings from the
pooled regression,  namely that the sensitivity of local rates to US T-Bill rates falls
abruptly in the 1990s. As noted earlier,  however, most of these countries  have in fact
belonged  to the DM (now EMU)  area for quite a few years, and it is unclear whether  US
rates  provide  the right measure  of "foreign  interest  rates"  for them.
18 South  Africa's multiple  exchange  rate regime  was  unified in 1995.
17To  illustrate  this  fact,  Table  6  presents  estimation  results  for  six  of  these
economies  using  the  German  T-bill  interest  rate  rather  than  the  US  T-bill  rate  as
explanatory  variable.  The results  are  revealing.  The slope  estimates  are  all  highly
significant  (with the exception of  Italy in the  1990s, whose available  sample is very
short).  The slope coefficients actually exceed one-significantly  so in all cases except
Belgium. 19  Thus, the declining  pattern of the  slope coefficients found in  the pooled
estimates is not a reflection of increased monetary independence but, on the contrary, a
straightforward consequence of the fact that these  countries have  de-linked themselves
from the US dollar area to become tightly linked with the DM.
Finally,  we  turn  to  the  industrial-country  floating  regimes.  Table  7  reports
regression results for three large economies (Germany, 20 Japan, and the UK) and three
smaller ones (Australia, New Zealand, and Canada).  The table shows a striking contrast
between the two groups.  The three smaller economies exhibit large slope coefficients
exceeding one-significantly  so in Australia and New Zealand.  Further, the explanatory
power of the estimated equations is fairly high.  The larger economies, in turn, all possess
slope coefficients below one.  For both the U.K. and Germany, the estimate for the 1990s
is insignificantly different from zero and significantly different from one. In turn, Japan
has the highest slope coefficient in this group (0.73). It is not significantly different from
one,  although  its  precision  is  relatively  low. 2'  Again  in  contrast  with  the  smaller
9 Again,  if one uses longer sample periods (starting in the 1970s  and 1980s),  the slope  coefficients  turn
smaller-showing an increasing  pattern  over  time, as the EMU  area consolidated.
20 Germany  obviously  does not float vis-a-vis  her  EMU partners,  but can be viewed  as floating  vis-a-vis  the
US dollar.
21  Japan's full-sample  estimate  under floating (corresponding  to the years 1973-99)  is 0.65, numerically
similar  to  that obtained in  the 1  990s,  but its precision  is much  higher  (a standard  error of 0.09), so that
it can be safely  viewed  as smaller than one.
18economies, the explanatory power of the empirical equations is quite poor for the three
large floating-regime economies.
To  summarize this  section,  the  closer  inspection  of  individual  country  data
confirms some of the findings from the pooled regressions, and also helps solve some of
the puzzles they posed.  On the whole, we find little evidence in the 1990s against the
hypothesis of full transmission of foreign interest rate disturbances into domestic rates,
regardless of exchange regime and income level. On the contrary, slope coefficients tend
to exceed one in several industrial and developing countries
There  are  exceptions, however.  Most  notably,  large  industrial countries with
floating regimes (Gernany  and the UK) exhibit slope coefficients well below unity.  This
suggests that large industrial countries may be the only economies that truly possess, or
make use of, monetary independence.
5.  Conclusions
In this paper we have tested whether the transmission of intemational interest rate
changes to local rates  is affected by  the exchange rate regime.  This is  an important
question in the context of the debate on the choice of currency regime, in which the issue
of  monetary  independence  has  played  a  central  role.  Proponents  of  free-floating
arrangements have  argued that  countries adopting floating regimes  would be  able to
pursue their own monetary policy goals, while advocates of hard pegs have  questioned
the feasibility of such a strategy in a world of high international capital mobility.
The paper has taken a first step towards assessing empirically the relative merits
of these two views, by reviewing the empirical regularities on international interest rate
19linkages for a large sample of industrial and developing countries.  The approach taken
here  extends  and  generalizes  earlier studies  that  have  focused on  a  small  group  of
countries over brief time periods.  Specifically, the paper has examined the evidence from
industrial and developing countries over the last three decades, using  both pooled  and
single-country empirical estimates.  The objective is to establish the main stylized facts
that will need to be addressed in the debate on monetary independence and the choice of
currency  regime.  To do  this,  we  have  employed simple reduced-form  specifications
relating domestic to world interest rates.  In spite of their simplicity, the empirical models
capture  a  large  proportion  of  the  variance  in  local  interest  rates,  within  and  across
countries.
The main result of the paper is that over the last decade all exchange rate regimes
exhibit high sensitivity of local interest rates to international ones.  Indeed, in the  1990s
we  find  very  few  instances  of  less-than-full  transmission  (i.e.,  a  slope  coefficient
significantly smaller than one), regardless of exchange rate regime.  This result emerges
both  from  the  country-specific  estimates  and  from  close  inspection  of  the  pooled
estimates.
The main exception to this rule is provided by  a few large industrial countries,
which  according to the  evidence in the paper appear to be the  only ones that can or
choose to benefit from independent monetary policy.  Specifically, the slope coefficients
for Germany and the UK-large  economies with floating regimes vis-a-vis the US-are
statistically smaller than one.  In contrast, in other industrial countries, including smaller
economies with floating regimes (Australia,  Canada,  and New  Zealand),  local interest
20rates fully reflect US rates.  Among developing-country floating regimes, the results are
somewhat noisier.
Interestingly, during the  1990s, interest rates in European countries have become
virtually insensitive to US interest rates-but  fully sensitive to  German interest rates.
Thus,  European countries have  shifted  from the  US monetary  area to  the  DM-EMU
monetary area between the 1970s and  1990s, and the  decline in the responsiveness  of
their interest rates to US interest rates does not signify any increase in their degree of
monetary independence.
It is important to note that the finding of complete transmission is masked in the
full-sample pooled estimates,  which  taken at  face value  would  appear to  support the
conventional wisdom-that  fixed currency regimes tend  to exhibit higher transmission
than more flexible regimes.  The main reason is that the long time span of the full sample
(30  years)  mixes  periods  characterized  by  very  different  degrees  of  interest  rate
transmission.  Indeed, the data suggest an upward time trend in the degree of sensitivity
of domestic to foreign interest rates, consistent with the  gradual removal of barriers to
international capital movements  and the  increased  financial integration  of  developing
economies with the rest of the world.
Finally, our pooled results suggest that interest rates are in most instances lower in
countries with fixed exchange rate regimes.  The difference appears particularly large in
developing countries.
To  conclude,  the  empirical  regularities  identified  in  the  paper  leave  many
questions open for future research. We shall mention three.  The first one concerns the
interpretation of our  finding of  full  transmission  in the  1990s, in  fixed  and  flexible
21regimes alike, except for large industrial economies.  Does this mean that floating-regime
countries are not able to pursue their independent monetary policy, or rather that they
choose not to float, perhaps due to fear of floating?
Related to this, what is the role of financial integration in the increasing degree of
interest rate transmission shown by the data?  The "Impossible Trinity" principle states
that countries can choose two of the following three: capital mobility, monetary policy,
and exchange rate flexibility.  However, the fact that we found virtually full transmission
in the 1  990s seems to imply that financial integration might be playing a bigger role than
the above principle suggests.
Finally,  the  paper  has  not explored  the  channels  through  which  international
interest rates are transmitted to  domestic rates,  nor  the  dynamics of the  transmission
process.  -For  example,  to  understand  better  the  determinants  of  the  degree  of
transmission, it would be useful to explore separately the impact of international rates on
country risk premium and currency premium.  This is the subject of ongoing research.
22Appendix: Exchange Rate Regime Classification
The starting point is the  IMF's  quarterly database  on  exchange rate  regimes,
which  encompasses a  total  of  10  categories, based  on  officially reported  exchange
arrangements for the period 1975-1996.
We transform the IMF database to a monthly basis, complementing the original
source with  information  contained  in  Cottarelli  and  Giannini  (1997).  Finally,  the
classification is extended until March  1999, using  information from IMF reports  and
publications,  including  the  Exchange  Rate  Arrangements  and  Restrictions  and  the
International Finance Statistics, 1998 and 1999.  For the countries used in the individual-
country estimates, we extend the classification until December 1999.  In addition to the
original classification, we construct new categories to account for the specific currency to
which some fixed regimes are pegged.
For most experiments in the paper, we condense the ten categories in the original
source into  three  broader  exchange  rate  regimes: fixed  (pegs), intermediate  (limited
flexibility, crawls, bands, managed floating), and  flexible (free-floating).  Specifically,
pegged regimes  include: peg  to the  US dollar, peg  to the  French franc, peg  to  other
currencies (comprising Indian rupee, South African  rand, British pound, and  Deutsche
mark), peg to SDR (IMF basket), and basket pegs (including the so-called Bretton Woods
basket peg).  In turn, intermediate regimes include: limited flexibility with respect to a
basket, limited flexibility with respect to a single currency, limited flexibility with respect
to  a  cooperative arrangement  (including  the  European  Monetary  System),  managed
floating, crawling pegs,  and crawling bands. The full details are given in the Appendix
Table.
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24Table 1
Local Interest Rate Responsiveness  to US T-bill Rate
by Exchange Rate Regime
The table reports the constant  and slope coefficients  of the local interest rate (money market)  on the US T-bill rate.  The models are calculated  by
exchange  rate regime. All regressions  contain country fixed effects and the inflation  differential between  each country and the US, which are not
reported  in the table to save  space. Data are from industrialized  and developing  countries  in the 1970s,  1980s,  and 1990s. Newey-West  standard  errors
are in parenthesis.  ** and * mean that the  estimate  is statistically  different  from 0 at the 5 percent and 10  percent significance  level respectively.
Constant  US T-bill  R-squared  R-squared  Number of  Number of
rate  total  within  countries  observations
Whole sample  0.05  0.76  0.76  0.56  47  9,441
(0.00)  (0.23)
Fixed  regimes  0.04  **  0.76  **  0.76  0.31  13  517
(0.01)  (0.31)
pegged to US dollar  0.06 **  0.68 *  0.75  0.38  7  323
(0.01)  (0.40)
pegged  to other currencies  0.02 **  0.64 **  0.71  0.28  8  194
(0.00)  (0.28)
Intermediate  regimes  0.08  **  0.55  **  0.84  0.39  39  6,160
(0.00)  (0.07)
band  0.05  **  0.60 **  0.56  0.17  30  4,098
(0.00)  (0.07)
managed floating  0.13 **  0.22  0.86  0.48  28  2,062
(0.01)  (0.19)
Free-floating regimes  0.10 **  0.27  0.85  0.30  27  2,764
(0.01)  (0.33)Table 2
Local Interest Rate Responsiveness to US T-bill Rate
by Income Group
The table reports the constant and slope coefficients of the local interest rate (money market) on the US T-bill rate.  The models are calculated by
exchange  rate regime. All regressions  contain country  fixed effects and the inflation  differential  between  each  country and the US, which are not reported
in the table to save space. Data are from industrialized  and developing  countries  in the 1970s, 1980s,  and 1990s. Industrialized  countries are: Australia,
Austria, Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark,  Finland, Germany,  Ireland,  Italy,  Japan,  Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Norway,  Portugal,  Spain, Sweden,  Switzerland,
and United  Kingdom. Developing  countries  are all the other countries listed in the Appendix  Table. Newey-West  standard  errors are in parenthesis. **
and * mean that the  estimate  is statistically  different  from 0 at the 5 percent  and 10  percent significance  level respectively.
Constant  US T-bill rate  R-squared  R-squared  Number  of  Number  of
total  within  countries  observations
Developing countries:
Whole sample  0.06 **  0.93  *  0.76  0.58  29  4,279
(0.01)  (0.56)
Fixed regimes  0.05 **  0.63  *  0.76  0.35  7  384
(0.01)  (0.34)
Intermediate regimes  0.11 **  0.45 **  0.85  0.43  25  2,933
(0.01)  (0.15)
Free-floating  regimes  0.24 **  -0.92  0.84  0.31  14  962
(0.02)  (I .11)
Industrialized  countries:
Whole sample  0.04 **  0.62 **  0.47  0.22  18  5,162
(0.00)  (0.07)
Fixed regimes  0.00  1.03 **  0.79  0.51  6  133
(0.01)  (0.19)
Intermediate  regimes  0.05 **  0.60 **  0.44  0.20  14  3,227
(0.00)  (0.06)
Free-floating  regimes  0.03  **  0.70 **  0.53  0.26  13  1,802
(0.00)  (0.21)Table 3
Local Interest Rate Responsiveness  to US T-bill Rate
Developing  Countries by Decade
The table reports the constant  and slope coefficients  of the local interest rate (money  market) on the US T-bill rate. The models are calculated  by
exchange  rate regime. All regressions  contain country fixed effects and the inflation  differential  between each country and the US, which are not
reported  in the table to save space. Newey-West  standard  errors  are in parenthesis. **  and * mean that the estimate  is statistically  different from 0 at
the 5 percent and 10  percent  significance  level respectively.
Constant  US T-bill  R-squared  R-squared  Number of  Number of
rate  total  within  countries  observations
1970s:
Fixed regimes  0.08 **  0.05  0.94  0.01  4  191
(0.00)  (0.10)
Intermediate  regimes  0.07 **  0.51 *  0.96  0.12  5  177
(0.01)  (0.27)
Free-floating regimes  0.22 **  -0.48  0.94  0.02  2  42
(0.06)  (0.71)
1980s:
Fixed  regimes  0.23  **  0.87  *  0.17  0.17  1  29
(0.06)  (0.49)
Intermediate  regimes  0.13  **  0.42  **  0.87  0.50  13  1,091
(0.02)  (0.18)
Free-floating  regimes  0.17 **  -0.01  0.90  0.02  4  294
(0.02)  (0.45)
990s:
Fixed regimes  0.01  1.09 **  0.64  0.62  2  164
(0.02)  (0.25)
Intermediate  regimes  0.11  **  0.76**  0.82  0.19  22  1,665
(0.01)  (0.37)
Free-floating regimes  0.41 **  -4.99  0.89  0.55  1 1  626
(0.04)  (4.24)Table 4
Local Interest  Rate Responsiveness to US T-bill Rate
Industrialized Countries by Decade
The table reports the constant and slope coefficients  of the local interest rate (money market) on the US T-bill rate. The models are calcu4ated  by
exchange rate regime. All regressions  contain country fixed effects and the inflation differential  between each country and the US, which are not
reported in the table to  save space.  Data are from industrialized and developing countries in the  1970s, 1980s, and  1990s.  Newey-West
standard errors are in parenthesis.  *  and * mean that the estimate is statistically different from 0 at the 5 percent and 10 percent significance
level respectively.
Constant  US T-bill  R-squared  R-squared  Number  of  Number  of
rate  total  within  countries  observations
1970s:
Fixed regimes  0.00  1.03 **  0.79  0.51  6  133
(0.01)  (0. I 9)
Intermediate  regimes  0.04  **  0.60  **  0.33  0.10  11  845
(0.00)  (0.13)
Free-floating  regimes  0.04  **  0.53 *  0.57  0.11  7  382
(0.01)  (0.27)
1980s:
Fixed  regimes  ..  ..  ..
Intermediate  regimes  0.06  **  0.49 **  0.72  0.27  12  1,314
(0.00)  (0. I 0)
Free-floating  regimes  0.06  **  0.38 **  0.79  0.14  7  616
(0.00)  (0.  19)
1990s:
Fixed  regimes  ..  ..  ..  ..
Intermediate  regimes  0.07  **  0.02  0.25  0.01  13  1,068
(0.00)  (0.16)
Free-floating  regimes  0.02  **  0.92  **  0.48  0.19  10  804
(0.00)  (0.29)Table 5
Local Interest Rate Responsiveness to US T-biUl  Rate
Developing Countries
The table reports the constant  and slope  coefficients of the local interest rate (money market) on the US T-bill rate. The coefficient  for inflation  is
not reported,  but it is included in all regressions. Newey-West  standard errors are in parenthesis. ** and * mean that the estimate is statistically
different from 0 at the S percent and 10  percent significance  level respectively.
US T-bill  Test  Number  of
Sample  Constant  slope = I  R-squared rate  observations
(p-value)
Fixed regimes:
Argentina  3/91- 12/99  0.01  1.33  0.70  0.71  106
(0.04)  (0.87)
Hong Kong  1/94-  12/99  0.01  1.01 **  0.96  0.16  72
(0.01)  (0.16)
Intermediate  regimes:
Chile  1/90 - 8/99  0.03  1.99 **  0.21  0.49  116
(0.04)  (0.80)
Indonesia  1/90-6/99  0.05  *  1.35  - 0.60  0.50  102
(0.03)  (0.67)
Israel  1/90 - 12/99  0.08 **  0.94  **  0.65  0.41  120
(0.01)  (0.12)
Singapore  1/90 - 12/99  0.00  0.86  **  0.21  0.41  120
(0.01)  (0.1 1)
Thailand  1/90  - 3/97  0.02  1.42  **  0.15  0.44  87
(0.01)  (0.29)
Free-floating  regimes:
Mexico  12/94-12/99  0.22  *  -1.22  0.38  0.76  61
(0.12)  (2.54)
Philippines  1/90-12/99  0.05  **  1.29  **  0.52  0.24  120
(0.02)  (0.46)
South Africa  1/90-12/99  0.06  **  1.44 **  0.02  0.44  120
(0.01)  (0.19)Table 6
Local Interest Rate Responsiveness  to German T-bill Rate
European  Industrial Countries  with Intermediate  Regimes
The table reports the constant and slope coefficients of the local interest rate (money market) on the German T-bill rate.  The
coefficient for inflation is not reported, but it is included in all regressions.  Newey-West standard errors are in parenthesis.
** and  * mean  that  the  estimate is statistically  different from  0  at  the  5 percent  and  10 percent  significance  level
respectively.
German  Test  Number of
Sample  Constant  Tbill  rate  slope=1  R-squared  observations
(p-value)
Belgium  1/90  - 12/98  0.00  1.02 **  0.38  0.95  108
(0.00)  (0.02)
Denmark  1/90 - 12/99  0.00  1.25 **  0.01  0.83  120
(0.00)  (0.  10)
Italy  1/90-8/92  0.07 **  0.53  0.28  0.16  32
(0.04)  (0.43)
Netherlands  1/90 - 12/98  0.00  1.05 **  0.00  0.99  108
(0.00)  (0.02)
Portugal  1/90 - 12/99  1.82 **  1.82 **  0.00  0.85  108
(0.  10)  (0.  10)
Spain  1/90 - 12/99  0.01  1.44 **  0.00  0.83  108
(0.01)  (0.13)Table 7
Local Interest Rate Responsiveness to US T-bill Rate
Industrial  Countries with Free-Floating Regimes
The table reports the constant and slope coefficients of the local interest rate (money market) on the US T-bill rate.  The
coefficient for inflation is not reported, but it is included in all regressions. Newey-West standard errors are in parenthesis.  **
and * mean that the estimate is statistically different from 0 at the 5 percent and 10  percent significance level respectively.
US T-bill  Test  Number  of
Sample  Constant  rate  slope =1  R-squared  observations
(p-value)
Australia  12/90-12/99  -0.02  2.02 **  0.00  0.83  78
(0.01)  (0.17)
Canada  1/90-12/99  -0.01  1.49 **  0.15  0.45  120
(0.02)  (0.34)
New Zealand  1/90-12/99  0.00  1.69  **  0.00  0.69  119
(0.01)  (0.18)
Germany  1/90-12/99  0.06 **  -0.10  0.00  0.01  108
(0.02)  (0.37)
Japan  1/90-12/99  -0.01  0.73  **  0.46  0.11  120
(0.02)  (0.37)
United Kingdom  9/92 - 12/99  0.06  **  0.05  0.00  0.03  88
(0.01)  (0.23)Appendix Table
List of Countries in Sample and Their Exchange Rate Regimes
Country  Period  .Exchange  Laelime  Classification
from  to  detailed  reate
Argentina  Jan-80  Mar-8I  Managed  floating  Intermediate
Apr-81  Jun-82  Indcpendently  floating  Floating
Jul-82  Jun-89  Managed  floating  lntermcdiatc
Jul-89  Nov-89  Peg  to US  dollar  Fixed
Dec-89  Feb-91  Independently  floating  Floating
Mar-91  Mar-99  Peg  to  US  dollar  Fixed
Australia  Oct-74  Nov-76  Limitcd  flexibility  with respect  to a  basket  Intermediatc
Dec-76  Nov-83  Managed  floating  Intermcdiatc
Dec-83  Jun-96  Independently  floating  Floating
Austria  Feb-70  Aug-71  Bretton  Woods  basket  peg  Fixed
Sep-71  Sep-94  Limited  flexibility  with respect  to a  basket  Intermediate
Oct-94  Dec-98  Limited  flexibility  with respect  to a  cooperative  arrangement  Intermediatc
Belgium  Feb-70  Dec-71  Bretton  Woods  baskct  peg  Fixed
Jan-72  Jan-99  Limited  flexibility  with respect  to a  cooperative  arrangement  Intermediate
Bolivia  Jan-95  Dec-97  Independently  floating  Floating
Jan-98  Dec-98  Managed  floating  Intcrmediate
Jan-99  Mar-99  Crawling  peg  Intermediate
Bmzil  Mar-90  Sep-94  Independently  floating  Floating
Oct-94  Dec-98  Managed  floating  Intermediate
Jan-99  Mar-99  Independently  floating  Floating
Canada  Jan-75  Mar-99  Indcpcndendy  floating  Floating
Chile  Jan-78  May-79  Independently  floating  Floating
Jan-80  May-82  Peg  to US  dollar  Fixed
Jun-82  Jun-82  Managed  floating  Intermediate
Jul-82  Dec-98  Crawling  pcg  to a  basket  Intermediate
Jan-99  Mar-99  Crawling  band  Intcrmediate
Colombia  Mar-95  Dec-98  Managed  floating  Intermediate
Jan-99  Mar-99  Crawling  band  Intermediate
Costa  Rica  Jan-90  Dec-91  Managed  floating  Intermediate
Jan-92  Sep-
95  Independently  floating  Floating
Oct-95  Dec-98  Managed  floating  Intermediate
Jan-99  Mar-99  Crawling  Pcg  Intermediate
Denmark  Jan-72  Mar-99  Limited  flexibility  with rcspect  to  a cooperdtive  arrangcmcnt  Intermediate
Dominican  Rcpublic  Mar-96  Mar-99  Managed  floating  Intermediate
Ecuador  Nov-86  Sep-
94  Managed  floating  Intermediate
Oct-94  Scp-95  Crawling  peg  to a  basket  Intcrmediate
Oct-95  Dec-98  Managed  floating  Intermediate
Jan-99  Mar-99  Crawling  band  Intermediatc
Egypt  Jan-97  Mar-99  Managed  floating  Intermediate
El Salvador  Jan-97  Mar-99  Managed  floating  Intermediatc
Finland  Dcc-77  Aug-92  Limited  flcxibility  with respect  to a  basket  Intermediate
Scp-92  Sep-96  Indcpcndently  floating  Floating
Oct-96  Mar-99  Limited  flcxibility  with rcspect  to a  cooperativc  arrangement  Intermcdiatc
Gcrmany  Feb-70  Apr-70  Bretton  Woods  basket  peg  Fixed
May-70  Dec-71  Independently  floating  Floating
Jan-72  Mar-73  Bretton  Woods  basket  peg  Fixed
Apr-73  Mar-99  Limited  flexibility  with respect  to a  cooperative  arrangement  Intermcdiate
Greece  Jan-90  Dec-94  Managed  floating  Intermcdiatc
Jan-95  Dec-96  Independently  floating  Floating
Jan-97  Feb-98  Managed  floating  Intermediate
Mar-98  Mar-99  Limited  flexibility  with respect  to a  cooperative  arrangcment  Intermediate
Guatemala  Jan-97  Mar-99  Independently  floating  Floating
Hong  Kong,  China  Dec-90  Mar-99  Peg  to US  dollar  Fixed
Indoncsia  Jan-83  Jul-98  Managed  floating  Intermediate
Aug-98  Jul-98  Independcntly  floating  Floating
Ireland  Mar-72  Apr-72  Bretton  Woods  basket  peg  Fixcd
Jun-72  Dcc-78  Peg  to pound  sterling  Fixed
Jan-79  Mar-99  Limited  flexibility  with respect  to  a cooperative  arrangemcnt  Intermediate
Israel  Jan-90  Nov-91  Limited  flexibility  with rcspect  to  a baskct  Intermediate
Dcc-91  Dcc-98  Managed  floating  Intermediate
Jan-99  Mar-99  Crawling  band  Intermediatc
Italy  Jan-71  Dce-71  Brctton  Woods  baskct  pcg  Fixed
Jan-72  Jan-73  Limited  flexibility  with  respect  to  US  dollar  Intermcdiatc
Fcb-73  Dec-78  Independently  floating  Floating
Jan-79  Aug-92  Limited  flcxibility  with respect  to  a cooperativc  arrangement  Intermediatc
Sep-
92  Sep-96  Indepcndently  floating  Floating
Oct-96  Mar-99  Limited  flcxibility  with rcspoct  to  a  cooperativc  arrangcmcnt  Intermcdiate
Japan  Jan-70  Dec-72  Bretton  Woods  basket  peg  Fixed
Jan-73  Mar-99  Independently  floating  Floating
Korea,  Rep.  Aug-76  Dcc-79  Peg  to US  dollar  Fixcd
Jan-80  Nov-97  Managed  floating  Intermediate
Dec-97  Mar-99  Independently  floating  Floating
Kuwait  Jan-79  Mar-99  Limited  flexibility  with respect  to  a basket  Intermediatc
Lebanon  Jan-82  Dcc-94  Indepcndcntly  floating  Floating
Malaysia  Jan-70  Jun-72  Peg  to  pound  stcrling  Fixed
Jul-72  Jun-73  Peg  to US  dollar  Fixed
Jul-73  Aug-75  Indcpendently  floating  Floating
Scp-
75  Mar-93  Limited  flexibility  with rcspcct  to  a basket  IntermediatcAppendix  Table
List of Countries  in Sample  and  Their  Exchange  Rate  Regimes
County  _Period  Exchange  Regime  Classification
from  to  detailed  a Zreate
Apr-93  Aug-98  Managed  floating  Intermediate
Sep-98  Mar-99  Pcg  to  US  dollar  Fixcd
Mauritius  Jan-88  Scp-94  Limitcd  flcxibility  with respect  to  a basket  Intcrmediatc
Oct-94  Mar-99  Managed  floatine  tntermediate
Mcxico  Apr-81  Jun-82  Managed  floating  Intermediatc
Jul-82  Scp-82  Peg  to US  dollar  Fixed
Oct-82  Nov-94  Managed  floating  lntcrmcdiatc
Dce-94  Mar-99  Indepcndently  floating  Floating
Netherlands  Jan-70  Apr-70  Bretton  Woods  basket  peg  Fixed
May-70  Dcc-71  Indepcndently  floating  Floating
Jan-72  Dec-98  Limitcd  flcxibility  with respect  to  a  coopcrative  arrangement  Intermediatc
Ncw  Zealand  Mar-85  Fcb-85  Managcd  floating  lntrnmcdiate
Mar-85  Mar-99  Indepcndcntly  floating  Floating
Norway  Jan-72  Nov-78  Limitcd  flexibility  with rcspect  to a  coopcrative  arrangcmcnt  Intermediate
Dec-78  Oct-90  Limitcd  flcxibility  with rcspcct  to a  basket  Intermcdiatc
Nov-90  Nov-92  Limited  flexibility  with respect  to a  cooperative  arangement  Intcrmediate
Dec-92  Apr-94  Independently  floating  Floating
May-94  Mar-99  Managed  floating  Intenmcdiatc
Paraguay  Oct-90  Jun-98  Indcpcndcntdy  floating  Floating
Philippines  Oct-81  Jun-82  Limited  flexibility with  respect  to  US  dollar  Intcnemdiate
Jul-82  Sep-84  Managed  floating  Intcrmediate
Oct-84  Mar-99  Indepcndently  floating  Floating
Portugal  Jan-83  Scp-90  Crawling  peg  to a  basket  Intenmediate
Oct-90  Mar-92  Managed  floating  Intermediate
Apr-92  Mar-99  Limitcd  flexibility  with respect  to  a  cooperative  arrangemcnt  Intermediate
Singapore  Aug-73  Jun-87  Limited  flcxibility with  respect  to  a baskct  Intermediatc
Jul-87  Mar-99  Managed  floating  Intermediate
South  Africa  Fcb-70  Apr-72  Brctton  Woods  basket  peg  Fixed
May-72  Sep-72  Peg  to  pound  sterling  Fixed
Oct-72  May-74  Pcg  to US  dollar  Fixed
Jun-74  Jun-75  Managed  floating  Intcrmcdiate
Jul-75  Jan-79  Pcg  to US  dollar  Fixed
Feb-79  Mar-99  Independcntly  floating  Floating
Spain  Jan-74  Jan-74  Bretton  Woods  basket  peg  Fixcd
Feb-74  Dcc-75  Limited  flexibility  with respect  to a  basket  Intermcdiate
Jan-76  Dec-87  Managed  floating  Intcrmediate
Jan-88  May-89  Indcpcndently  floating  Floating
Jun-89  Mar-99  Limited  flexibility  with respect  to a  cooperativc  arrangemcnt  Intcmcdiate
Swcden  Jan-70  Dcc-71  Brctton  Woods  baskct  peg  Fixcd
Jan-72  Jul-77  Limited  flexibility  with respect  to a cooperativc  arrangement  Intermediate
Aug-77  Apr-91  Limited  flexibility  with rcspect  to a  baskct  Intenmediatc
May-91  Oct-92  Limited  flexibility  with respect  to a  cooperative  arrangement  Intcrmediate
Nov-92  Mar-99  Indepcndendy  floating  Floating
Switzcrland  Sep-75  Sep-78  Independcntly  floating  Floating
Oct-78  Dcc-79  Pcg  to Dcutschc  mark  Fixed
Jan-80  Mar-99  Indepcndently  floating  Floating
Thailand  Jan-77  Feb-78  Pcg  to US  dollar  Fixcd
Mar-78  Jun-8  I  Limited  flexibility with  respect  to  a  basket  Intermcdiatc
Jul-81  Mar-82  Managod  floating  Intermediate
Apr-82  Oct-84  Limited  flexibility  with respect  to  US  dollar  Intermediate
Nov-84  Jun-
97  Limited  flexibility with rcspect  to  a basket  Intermediate
Jul-97  Jun-98  Managed  floating  Intermediatc
Jul-98  Mar-99  Independently  floating  Floating
Turkcy  Apr-86  Dec-98  Managcd  floating  Intermediate
Jan-99  Mar-99  Crawling  peg  Intcrmediate
United  Kingdom  Jul-72  Apr-72  Bretton  Woods  basket  pcg  Fixed
May-72  Jun-72  Limited  flcxibility  with respect  to US  dollar  Intermcdiate
Jul-72  Feb-87  Indepcndcntly  floating  Floating
Mar-87  Feb-88  Managed  floating  Intcnemdiate
Mar-88  Scp-
90  Independently  floating  Floating
Oct-90  Jun-92  Limited  flexibility  with respcct  to a  cooperative  arangement  Intermcdiate
Jul-92  Mar-99  Independently  floating  Floating
Uruguay  Dec-92  Dec-98  Managed  floating  Intcrmcdiate
Jan-99  Mar-99  Crawling  band  Intermcdiate
Vcnczuela  Apr-96  Dcc-98  Managed  floating  Intermcdiate
Jan-99  Mar-99  Crawling  band  IntermediatcPolicy  Research Working  Paper  Series
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